Qualitative analysis of governance provisions and return structures for equity investments in joint venture real estate projects by Jackson, Eric L. (Eric Lathrop)
 
What About the Equity? 
A Qualitative Analysis of Governance Provisions and Return Structures for Equity 
Investments in Joint Venture Real Estate Projects 
 
by 
 
Eric L. Jackson 
 
B.S., Entrepreneurship and Small Business Management, 1997 
 
Northeastern University 
 
 
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Real Estate Development 
 
at the 
 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
September, 2005 
 
©2005 Eric L. Jackson 
All rights reserved 
 
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper 
and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part. 
 
 
Signature of Author          
Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
     August 5, 2005 
 
Certified by           
     Lynn Fisher 
     Assistant Professor of Real Estate 
     Thesis Supervisor 
 
Accepted by           
David Geltner 
     Chairman, Interdepartmental Degree Program in   
     Real Estate Development  
 
 
 
 2
What About the Equity? 
A Qualitative Analysis of Governance Provisions and Return Structures for Equity 
Investments in Joint Venture Real Estate Projects 
 
by 
 
Eric L. Jackson 
 
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on August 5, 2005 in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Real Estate 
Development 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper looks at the equity component of real estate finance – the equity portion of the 
capital stack, if you will.  It begins by characterizing the process through which real 
estate equity is secured by developers, and conversely, how it is placed by investors.  It 
moves on to a discussion of the typical components of joint venture real estate LLC 
operating agreements – the primary document used to formalize joint equity investments 
in real estate projects.  Through the author’s observation of a collection of operating 
agreements (primarily at the institutional level) governing both operating real estate 
projects and ground-up development projects, the paper discusses the six primary 
governance issues that are common across most joint venture real estate projects - 
financing and capital structure, cash management, leasing, investment horizon, dispute 
resolution and defaults, and certain administrative issues.  It further outlines how 
contractor control, control of the construction process and cash management issues 
emerge as the three additional critical governance issues in ground-up development 
projects.  The paper continues with a discussion of the two primary return structure 
models prevalent in the market today – preferred equity and participating equity.  While 
the models are often tailored to meet the specific needs of parties to different 
transactions, the primary negotiated variables – hurdle return rates, profit percentages 
(promotes), and carried interest amounts – generally remain consistent.  The author 
observes that the level of contractual control demanded by investors does not necessarily 
increase with projects of greater risk.  Instead, the quantity of controllable issues 
increases.  Further, there appears to be a positive correlation between the level of control 
demanded by an investor and the investor’s level of investment in the project as a 
percentage of total equity.  Additionally, as the priority of an investor’s ownership claim 
rises (i.e. straight preferred equity over participating equity), the level of direct 
contractual control demanded by the investor tends to decrease. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Info-mercials, Chickens and the “Equity Gap” 
I am a real estate developer.  I want to find a piece of real estate, gain control of it, 
improve it, and benefit from my efforts.  On the surface, it seems like a pretty simple 
concept.  Three easy steps – 1) find it, 2) control it, and 3) improve it.....and then it’s 
payday!  Nothing to it…..right?!! 
 
Well, here’s the good news.  If you stop reading this now and flip to channel 68, you will 
find several entertaining info-mercials that will reinforce this simplicity…..and for as 
little as $19.95, you can buy a video tape (now available in DVD as well) that may in fact 
convince you that buying and selling real estate is your most efficient and luxurious route 
to fame and fortune and perhaps that mansion on the gulf coast of Florida from whence 
they shot the TV spot. 
 
Here’s the bad news.  Countless hundreds have tried that route and have proven that by 
strictly following the easy steps in your video manual, the chances you will ever make as 
much money in real estate as they actor they hired to shoot the info-mercial made from 
his 30-minute cameo are comparable to that of chicken trying to parallel park an 18-
wheeler (the later part of this comparison has been tested less rigorously). 
 
What’s the point, you ask?  Well, the point is, it’s just not that easy.  And what does a 
chicken’s parallel parking savvy have to do with equity investments in real estate?  Well, 
nothing.  But ponder this for a moment.  Let’s look at the three simple steps described 
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above.  Take the first step - finding a piece of real estate.  Much time and resources are 
dedicated to understanding the physical characteristics of real estate.  On a practical level, 
our interaction with the physical aspects of real estate is quite prevalent.  In fact we all 
use a variety of real estate products everyday – we live and sleep in residential real estate, 
we work in commercial real estate, we shop in retail real estate, etc.  The resulting body 
of common and academic knowledge about how to find a piece of real estate is extensive 
and fairly comprehendible for your average developer.  Take the third step – improving 
the real estate.  This “improvement” process is pretty well understood as well.  There are 
volumes of academic writings that explain step by step how to fix a roof or pave a 
parking lot or even build a building.  By golly there’s even a whole bunch of construction 
experts and contractors out there that will do it for us at a pretty darn good price.   
 
But what about that second step – gaining control of the real estate?  There is inherently a 
little more to this.  Frankly, there’s a lot more.  How do we gain control of it?  Well, we 
can buy it, we can lease it, we can option it, we can ask our friend to buy it with the 
understanding that we will buy it from him or her later….the list goes on and on.  But 
let’s keep it simple for now.  Let’s assume we buy it.  And, in order to buy it, we 
probably need some money.  And, since we have not struck it as rich as the guy on the 
info-mercial, let’s assume we don’t have enough.  What do we do now?  Well, by George 
let’s do what everybody does…..let’s borrow it (ah yes, debt…..another topic well-
understood by developers and lay-people alike).  But here’s the catch!  What if, after 
we’ve borrowed as much as we can, we still don’t have enough?  Well, my friend, this is 
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the question developers have been asking themselves for years and years - how do we fill 
this “equity gap”.   
 
In today’s day and age, there are a host of reasons that a developer may have an equity 
gap.  And it may not be that he or she just doesn’t have enough money.  In fact, it is quite 
commonly by design.  There are so many ways to finance real estate projects these days, 
and so many different sources of capital, that every real estate project must be analyzed 
carefully to determine the most favorable financial structure. 
 
This paper attempts to address the equity component of real estate finance.  Specifically, 
it will undertake a comprehensive description of the typical components of joint venture 
real estate operating agreements, it will outline of the key contractual control provisions 
that govern the decision making rights within these agreements, and it will analyze the 
common equity return structures that accompany them.  Further, it will attempt to outline 
the key differences between the governance provisions associated with investments in 
ground-up development projects versus those of existing operating properties (the 
distinguishing feature between the two being the existence of a construction phase in a 
development project).  In preparation for these issues, this paper will characterize the 
process by which real estate equity is secured by developers and placed by investors and 
it will categorize the primary participants in the process.  If there’s time, it will also 
address chickens and their history with parallel parking.   
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Inspiration and Methodology 
This paper was inspired by the author’s opinion that there seems to be a lack of academic 
focus on real estate equity.  In graduate programs across the country, there is a plethora of 
information available regarding debt within the real estate industry (from regular 
mortgage loans to CMBS), and there is a wealth of information related to private equity 
as it applies to corporate finance.  But there appears to be a relatively limited body of 
literature on modern real estate equity, and specifically, the sponsor-investor joint venture 
relationship, which is a widely used model in today’s real estate world.  This paper is not 
intended to be a comprehensive analysis of real estate equity, but rather and introduction 
to the major participants in the industry, the process of securing real estate equity, and the 
nature of the sponsor-investor relationship as it relates to governance and return structure.  
It is the author’s hope that this paper may stimulate a bit more research on this very 
important and largely uncharted (from an academic perspective) territory. 
 
The information presented in this paper is based on a three-pronged research approach.  
First, a literature review was completed through which the author explored a variety of 
existing publications related directly or indirectly to the subject matter.  Primary topics of 
research included financial contracting theory, incomplete contracting theory, capital 
structure as it relates to corporate finance as well as real estate finance, the theory of the 
firm, organizational architecture and private equity practices.  This background provided 
a solid foundation upon which to base real estate equity-specific findings.  Second, the 
author collected and analyzed a variety of modern operating agreements that are currently 
in use by an array of institutional and private equity providers (the collection includes 
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documents from REITS, Pension funds, opportunity funds, investment banks and high net 
worth individuals).  This collection includes contracts governing multi-family projects, 
retail projects, hotel projects, office projects, and industrial projects.  Further, the author 
specifically looked at projects with varying risk-profiles (from stabile operating 
properties to ground-up development projects).  Most of the documentation that was 
studied was institutional in nature.  That is, it was created to be used for the placement of 
equity funds by institutional investors (as opposed to private investors), the likes of which 
will be outlined in more detail below.  Accordingly, this paper will focus largely on joint 
venture relationships where the equity provider is an institutional investor.  While equity 
investments by private individuals often share many of the same characteristics, and 
certainly present a host of interesting issues, the market space associated with such 
investments tends to be less transparent and documentation governing such investments 
tends to be less standardized and less accessible.  Third and finally, the author conducted 
interviews, either in person or by way of the telephone, with fifteen industry 
professionals.  This group of professionals includes both local and national developers, a 
variety of equity providers (both institutional and private in nature) including REITS, 
investment banks, pension funds, opportunity funds, and high net worth individuals, as 
well as real estate attorneys.  For the purposes of this study, the identities of interviewees 
(as well as the actual operating agreements) must remain confidential. 
 
Much of the research regarding governance provisions in this paper looks at the 
allocation of decision-making control.  This decision-making control affords the entity in 
possession of such control freedom to act and make decisions as they see fit in order to 
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adjust to the ever-changing economy and real estate environment.  Accordingly, in many 
ways, the allocation of decision-making control is loosely analogous with risk allocation 
(albeit with a negative correlation).  That is, possessing contractual decision-making 
control affords the ability to make risk-aversion decisions, and therefore is, in itself, a 
tool for regulating risk.  As such, the allocation of control and the allocation of risk, at 
least for the purposes of this paper, are considered to be directly related to each other. 
 
Findings 
This study, which is largely descriptive in nature, presents seven primary findings.  They 
are as follows:  
• There are six primary governance issues that are a part of most joint venture 
operating agreements including financing and capital structure, cash management, 
leasing, investment horizon, dispute resolution and defaults, and certain 
administrative issues. 
• With respect to ground-up development projects, there are three additional key 
governance issues including contractor control, construction process control and 
development related cash management and capital calls. 
• The level of control required by an investor does not necessarily change across 
properties of different risk, instead, the quantity of issues that must be controlled 
increases. 
• There is a direct relationship between the level of control demanded by an 
investor and that investor’s level of investment in a project (as a percentage of 
total equity). 
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• Preferred equity investments and participating equity investments are the two 
primary types of equity return structures in wide use today. 
• Investors with preferred equity positions in real estate projects will generally 
require less direct decision-making control then their participating counterparts. 
• The primary negotiated variables with respect to real estate equity returns are the 
hurdle return rates, profit percentages (promotes), and carried interest amounts, all 
of which are highly variable. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE PLAYERS AND THE PROCESS 
A Few Generalizations 
In the “real world”, things are complicated.  The roles played by the major real estate 
industry participants are often skewed and fuzzy.  Equity providers sometimes act as 
developers, developers sometimes provide equity, investment advisors and investment 
banks sometimes do both, or neither, and on and on.  Sometimes, through a syndication, 
there are 20 different equity providers in a real estate project, and sometimes there is only 
one.  It is as a result of these blurry lines and gray areas that I fear any attempt on my part 
to present my findings in a manner that is “consistent with the world’s inconsistencies,” 
would leave us all more confused than when we started.  Therefore, like many brave and 
bold pioneers before me, I will attempt to stylize things a bit.  But, in doing so, it is as 
important that the reader be aware of this stylization as it is that the writer stylize it.  So 
consider yourself warned! 
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Now that I’ve adequately disclaimed myself, let me next completely contradict myself.  
When I said the real world is complicated, I was exaggerating.  I needed to make a point!  
It’s actually not that bad (this is the confidence-building section of this paper).  In fact, if 
you’ll allow me to overuse the word “most” for a moment, I think I can sum it up in a 
few sentences.  Here goes.  Most of the time, most of the major industry participants will 
focus mostly on their most central business activities.  Further, most joint venture real 
estate projects adhere to most of the common governance guidelines (although most of 
these are tailored a bit to be most effective for the specific deal) and assume most of the 
common structural components.  For the most part!   
 
While we’re on the topic of generalizations, let’s clarify one other central point.  For the 
purposes of this paper we will use the term “joint venture” to refer loosely to a real estate 
project where there are two or more “equity partners” (one typically being the sponsor) 
who hold an equity interest in the project.  The intention here however is to differentiate 
the joint venture structure from the “syndicated” structure, which also implies a situation 
where two or more parties hold an equity interest in the project.  The primary difference 
between the two is that a syndicated structure implies a scenario where the equity 
ownership rights have been reduced to securities and sold to a group of investors.  
Traditionally it would also imply a larger group of investors than in a simple joint venture 
project where you can usually count them on one hand, and quite often on just two or 
three fingers.  In fact, it is overwhelmingly common for there to be just two equity 
partners, one being the developer (sponsor) and one being the primary equity provider 
(investor).  For the most part, it is this simple bilateral sponsor-investor relationship that 
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we will examine throughout this paper.  Before we get there though, let’s look at some of 
the participants we alluded to earlier. 
 
The Sponsor 
For the purposes of this paper, we will define the sponsor as follows:  Those who seek 
profit by identifying and developing or operating real estate investment opportunities.  
Traditionally, this role is played by the entity that we commonly know as the “local 
developer”.  However, this term implies two things which may or may not be true.  First, 
the term “developer” implies a focus on ground-up development, which really only 
covers a portion of the population of joint venture projects (and, frankly, of real estate 
projects in general).  There is a larger subset of projects that are “operating” in nature.  
That is, they involve the acquisition of existing operating properties.  Accordingly, there 
is a population of entities whose primary business is pursuing these operating projects.  
As you might expect, consistent with our “fuzzy roles” scenario described above, many 
entities will do both.  In any case, we will use the term sponsor to describe all of these 
entities.  Further, the term “local” implies a local focus which also may be erroneous as 
many modern developers have a much broader geographical scope (see the next 
paragraph).  While real estate, at least at the “project level,” is very much a local 
business, the fundamentals, and associated skill sets, are quite mobile.   
 
Sponsors can be categorized several ways.  Generally, these categorizations fall into three 
subsets – scope of business, product type, and risk profile.  Scope of business refers to a 
sponsor’s geographic orientation, and generally is either local, regional, national, or 
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international in nature.  Product type refers to the types of real estate products a sponsor 
may specialize in.  The primary product types are residential, office, industrial, retail, and 
hotel (which is really a type of residential, but its business model is different enough that, 
in many settings, it warrants its own category).  Some sponsors will specialize in just one 
product type while others will be involved in all of them.  Risk profile refers to the risk 
inherent in a particular project.  In general, the risk of a real estate project is a direct 
function of the stability of its cash flows.  For example, a class A office building with a 
long-term lease to a Fortune 100 company will offer a much more stabile set of cash 
flows than a speculative ground-up development project that won’t be completed for two 
years and has no pre-leasing commitments.  The risk profiles of these projects, therefore, 
are dramatically different.  Generally, there are five major risk categories from an 
institutional investment perspective.  They are as follows: 
• Core – This is the least risky subset.  It generally involves high quality real estate 
with very stabile cash flows. 
• Core-plus – This is slightly more risky than core.  It usually involves high quality 
real estate with some curable flaw. 
• Value-Added – This is midway down the “risk-list” and typically involves real 
estate with a more serious value impediment. 
• Opportunistic – This is the most risky of all “operating” real estate.  It may 
involve complete redevelopment projects, acquisitions of vacant properties, etc.   
• Development – Often falls under the “opportunistic” title, but is really a separate 
subset.  It may be further broken down into speculative development versus pre-
 15
leased or build-to-suit development, which, in themselves, have different risk 
profiles.   
 
Some sponsors will focus on properties with a particular risk profile while others will 
have a more broad orientation. 
 
The Investor 
For the purpose of this paper, we will define the investor as follows:  Those who seek 
profit by securing equity positions in real estate projects on behalf of themselves or 
others.  The investor is the equity provider.  Typically, in a bilateral (investor-sponsor) 
joint venture, the equity provider will furnish most, if not all, of the equity capital.  In the 
“typical” scenario, they rely on the sponsor to source and operate the project, although 
the role of the investor can take many forms and is often more comprehensive.  There is a 
great variety of entities that provide equity for real estate projects.  In fact, the list is long 
enough that the author has decided to let the reader perform its own detailed due 
diligence on each, as a comprehensive description of these investors would likely out-
read the subject research.  They are as follows: 
• Pension Funds 
• Endowment Funds 
• Trust Funds 
• Specialized Real Estate Funds 
o Core Funds 
o Core-Plus Funds 
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o Value-Added Funds 
o Opportunity Funds 
o Funds of Funds 
• REITS (Real Estate Investment Trusts) 
• REOC (Real Estate Operating Companies) 
• Corporations 
• Insurance Companies 
• High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI’s) 
• 1031 Exchange Buyers 
• Tenant-In-Common Buyers 
• Foreign Investors (may be institutional or HNWI’s) 
• Investment Banks 
• Investment Advisors 
 
While this list is not comprehensive and involves some overlap, it outlines the major 
equity providers that are active in the industry today.  As a function of the need for 
portfolio diversification and real estate’s growing role as a major asset class, pension 
funds have been a growing (and are now the largest) source of equity funds for the real 
estate industry.  Many of their equity investments are placed through opportunity funds or 
investment advisors and still others are placed directly.  The term investor, as it is used 
throughout this paper, will generally refer to one of the equity providers on this list.  As 
mentioned above, most of our research involved institutional equity providers so our 
discussion is slanted in that direction. 
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The Process 
Somehow the sponsors and investors must come together.  Like any other “market” 
where there are “buyers” and “sellers”, sometimes the parties come together directly, 
through private networks or previous relationships, and sometimes they come together 
through an intermediary, like an investment bank or a broker.  In either case, there are 
two things that hold constant.  First, there will always be an underlying property or 
properties that serve as the basis for investment.  Second, there will always be some form 
of agreement between the sponsor and equity provider that governs how the property 
investment will be operated and how the profits and losses will be shared.  These 
governing agreements are as varied as the underlying properties.  In small and 
unsophisticated transactions, these agreements may be as basic as a verbal arrangement 
between the parties or a simple “handshake” understanding.  On the other hand, at the 
largest institutional level, these agreements may consist of hundreds of pages of legal 
documents.  But in either case, the parties must find each other.  Let’s look at some of the 
issues that each party must contend with in approaching these transactions. 
 
How does a sponsor source equity? 
Sometimes sponsors will secure equity first and then find a property or properties later. 
Other times, sponsors will find a property or properties first, and then secure the equity.  
This is a business decision on behalf of the sponsor, driven by individual firm goals and 
objectives.  In either case, we will assume that the sponsor has a reasonable level of 
experience in the field, efficient access to the property market, and efficient access to 
debt financing.  We will also assume that the sponsor has a limited amount of internal 
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funds and wishes to use such funds as sparingly as possible so as to maximize the number 
of projects it can pursue.  In a typical real estate project, the sponsor may be able to 
secure somewhere between 50% to 85% of the acquisition costs (depending on the nature 
of the project – i.e. ground-up development vs. existing asset, pre-leased vs. speculative, 
etc.) from debt financing sources.  The rest will have to come from equity.  The sponsor 
can raise equity in one of two ways.  First, the sponsor could identify one or more 
investors who would be willing to contribute equity directly at the project level (or 
project entity level, as will be discussed later) in return for a share of the ownership of the 
project.  This is what we have identified as the joint venture method and it is, of course, 
the primary focus of this paper.  Second, the developer could pursue the process of 
securitizing equity shares of the ownership and, in turn, selling the securities to 
prospective investors.  As noted above, this is commonly known as the syndication 
process.  While there are obvious inherent similarities between the two methods, there are 
also significant differences.  First, depending on the number of securities to be sold and 
the nature of the sale, certain procedures outlined by the SEC may need to be employed 
in a syndication.  The purpose of this is to protect prospective purchasers of a security 
from any fraudulent activities or misrepresentations.  SEC regulations are generally not a 
concern under the joint venture method.  Further, as the holder of a security under a real 
estate syndication generally posses a more diluted interest in the project, their control 
rights are often equally diluted - sometimes to the point where the sponsor ultimately has 
100% of the decision making authority.  In a joint venture this is generally not the case.  
Joint venture equity holders will all usually have some degree of control over the 
outcome of the project.  This direct control is typically stronger than that of syndicated 
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security holders.  Many sponsors who elect to pursue the syndication route have a well-
established network of investors to which they regularly offer their real estate securities.  
Others may find themselves sourcing new investors on a deal by deal basis.  More 
prolific sponsors may have in-house securities brokerage personnel while others may use 
outside brokerage professionals. 
 
Like the syndication-oriented sponsors discussed in the preceding paragraph, many 
sponsors who typically use the joint venture approach to sourcing equity also have well-
established networks of investors.  In sourcing this equity, they will generally select from 
the menu of equity providers outlined above, depending on which classes of investors are 
available to them as dictated by their track record and the nature of the investment 
opportunity.  Less established sponsors may again find themselves scouting for joint 
venture partners on a deal-by-deal basis.  Many sponsors have relationships with 
mortgage brokers who are taking a more central role in matching sponsors with equity 
providers. 
 
Regardless of funding method, other things being equal, sponsors are generally motivated 
to find the equity provider who will offer the best “cost of capital.”  That is, the least 
expensive equity source.  The cost of equity can be measured by the required returns to 
be paid on such capital as well as the profit sharing splits (the “promote,” discussed 
below) after certain return hurdles have been met.  Sponsors are also motivated to 
maximize their level of direct project decision-making control in an effort to minimize 
their risk. 
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How does an investor place equity? 
Much like sponsors must “pick their poison” with respect to the types of projects they 
will focus on, investors must determine what types of projects they will pursue before 
actually placing the equity.  Generally, investors will establish their return requirements 
and project criteria before approaching the sponsor community so that they can better 
pursue opportunities in a focused an expeditious way.  Similar to the way sponsors search 
for equity funding, investors will employ a variety of methods in sourcing equity 
placement opportunities.  Many investors have well-established networks of sponsors that 
they work with, while others tend to find sponsors project by project.  Investors will 
make use of brokers, investment bankers, attorneys, advisors, mortgage brokers, and 
other intermediaries in search of appropriate investment opportunities.  In any case, 
investors generally cite three issues as the most important determinants of project 
selection – the quality of the opportunity (that is, the real estate opportunity itself), the 
track-record of the sponsor, and integrity of the sponsor.   
 
Generally, investors (particularly institutional investors) are motivated to place equity.  
Often, the more equity an investor (again, particularly institutional investors) can place, 
and the faster it can place it, the greater their opportunities for profit.  In some cases, 
investors, who are investing on behalf of others, take investment management fees based 
on the aggregate value of invested capital.  Prudent investors acting in this capacity must 
therefore balance their desire to place equity and their obligation to secure quality 
investments. 
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CHAPTER 3: OPERATING AGREEMENTS – THE FUNDAMENTALS 
The Entity and the Agreement 
The first step in formalizing the joint venture relationship is to establish an entity.  This 
entity, whose equity interests (shares of ownership) will be owned by the joint venture 
partners, will likely hold title to the subject real estate (or it will control the entity that 
will hold title).  Today, the overwhelming majority of these entities are created in the 
form of an LLC (except in Texas where LP’s are typically used, as LLC’s are subject to a 
unique entity-level tax).  An LLC is formed by the filing of articles of organization with 
the Secretary of State in the state of establishment (although it will need to be legally 
recognized in all regions within which it wishes to do business).  It is a non-corporate 
entity that affords its owners, called members, the limited liability of a corporate 
shareholder as well as the flow-through tax treatment of a partnership.  An LLC is 
generally managed by a manager, who may or may not be a member (managing 
member).  Typically, in joint venture real estate transactions, one of the members (usually 
the sponsor) serves in the capacity of managing member.   
 
Once the LLC is formed, rules for its operations must be created.  This is done in the 
form of an operating agreement.  If the LLC were a country, the operating agreement 
would be its’ constitution.  The LLC operating agreement will not only define the nature 
of the entity and the guidelines for its operations, but it will also govern how all cash 
flows and distributions will be handled (as the money flows from the operations and 
activities of the real estate asset). 
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This section aims to outline the key components of typical LLC operating agreements 
formed for the purpose of governing joint venture real estate transactions.  It should be 
noted here that even implying that there is a degree of typicality in these agreements 
would likely come under fire by many industry experts.  Like with any contract, the 
structure and content of an operating agreement may vary widely depending on the nature 
of the situation, the intentions of the parties and the preferences of those who ultimately 
draft and edit the document itself.  However, due to the nature of our regulatory system 
and the common purpose of these documents, there is, at a bare minimum, a set of issues 
that must regularly be addressed and that will commonly be encountered in an operating 
agreement of this type.  This section does not intend to be a comprehensive inventory of 
all issues related to these documents, nor does the order of topics below reflect an 
organizational structure that is at all industry standard.  Instead, this is intended to be a 
cohesive introduction to some of the more common issues and clauses found in these 
agreements. 
 
Definitions 
Operating agreements, like many other contracts, will often lay out a glossary of key 
terms that will be encountered within the document.  This section is intended to be a 
point of reference for the interpreter.  Sometimes it is included at the beginning of the 
document and other times it is at the end. 
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General Provisions 
Real estate operating agreements, although specific in purpose, must also address regular 
legal issues surrounding the company’s formation.  This is commonly done in the general 
provisions section of the document.  This section, which does not always carry this title,  
is typically at the beginning of the agreement and will address such issues as how and 
where the subject entity was formed, the name of the entity, the place of business of the 
entity and the purpose and authorized activities to be undertaken by the entity.  It also 
may identify any agents of the company and the intended term of the company’s affairs.  
It may list or reference the names and addresses of its members, and it may describe how 
title to company property shall be held and how filings of certificates, statements and 
other instruments related to the furtherance and continuation of the entity shall be 
handled. 
 
Capital Contributions, Members Loans and Capital Accounts 
This is a critical section.  Its general purpose is to identify the initial capital contributions 
of each party, any subsequent additional capital contributions of each party, what happens 
in the event of a shortfall, and how capital accounts will be handled for the members.  
The complexity of this section and the related procedures may vary depending on the 
nature of the project. 
 
As might be expected, identifying the initial capital contributions is pretty straight 
forward.  This item is typically pre-negotiated in prior discussions or a letter of intent, 
and the operating agreement simply formalizes the business deal.  Initial capital 
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contributions often come in the form of cash, but it is not uncommon for a contribution to 
be in the form of real property, to which a value is tied.  As will be discussed further in 
the “Distributions” section of this chapter, initial capital contributions will accrue interest 
(although it is generally not regarded as entity-level debt-like interest, but equity return to 
be repaid in the event the company profits as expected) at a pre-determined rate of return.  
Sometimes these rates of return are defined in this section, but they are also commonly 
defined under distributions. 
 
Additional capital contributions (also known as “capital calls”) are a bit stickier.  
Generally, in the event the entity requires additional capital to fund its’ operations, the 
members will be either asked or required to contribute such additional capital.  Parties to 
these contracts will sometimes limit their exposure by including a cap on their total 
investment (including all contributions), while other times their exposure to continued 
capital contributions is only limited by their ability to sell the project or their interest in 
the ownership entity.  Such additional capital contributions are commonly contributed on 
a pro-rata basis according to some pre-agreed upon percentage – often either the 
member’s percentage interest in the entity or in accordance with their initial capital 
contributions.  This seems simple enough, right?  Not really.  What about the timing of 
the additional contributions?  What about the returns to be earned on additional 
contributions versus the initial contributions?  What happens if a member fails to make a 
contribution?  And perhaps most importantly, who makes these decisions?  These are all 
very critical questions - questions (among several others) that lie at the heart of the risk 
allocation process. 
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Let’s look first at the timing question.  Generally, in the case of a ground-up development 
or a sizable renovation project, the investor will require that an acquisition/development 
budget and schedule be prepared and approved by all parties prior to entering into an 
agreement.  This schedule (typically attached to the agreement itself) will serve as the 
basis for planned capital contributions.  So long as the timing and costs stay at or near 
those in the budget, the process moves along on track.  In acquisitions of operating 
properties, where large initial construction costs and regular capital calls are not 
budgeted, additional capital contributions, which will be less development-oriented and 
therefore of smaller magnitude (hopefully), may still be tied to an operating budget. 
 
It is the unbudgeted capital calls, however, that cause the most concern.  Again, there will 
often be differences here related to the development or non-development nature of the 
project.  Development projects will often be more comprehensive in describing the nature 
of additional capital contributions.  For example, a development project may go so far as 
to classify the reasons for additional capital contributions, tying different rates of return 
and different contribution proportions to each.  Additional contributions resulting from 
cost overruns might be classified as either “unanticipated or unforeseen”, “discretionary 
or elective”, or “erroneous”.  Unanticipated cost overruns, which occur at no fault to the 
sponsor or the investor, may be split pro-rata at a base percentage.  Discretionary 
overruns, which result from the members’ joint determination to expand the scope of the 
project, may be split at a second percentage, and erroneous cost overruns, resulting from 
sponsor error, omission or fraudulent activity (collectively known as “bad boy acts”) may 
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be born entirely by the sponsor.  Quite often these additional capital contributions will 
accrue interest at different (typically higher) rates of return than the initial capital 
contributions (described further under “Distributions”, below), except that additional 
contributions of the sponsor resulting from bad-boy acts will commonly not be repaid at 
all.  In acquisitions of operating properties (where there may be current cash flow from 
operations) additional capital contributions (which may result from an operational cash 
flow shortage, among other things) are more likely to be optional in nature, but may still 
accrue at a different rate of return. 
 
Nonetheless, whether the additional contributions are mandatory or optional, the money 
must come from somewhere, and the source of this capital can have a dramatic impact on 
the return scenarios for the members of the entity.  Further, the provision of such capital 
may be of critical importance for the long-term health of the project.  So, what happens if 
a member does not contribute its share of this capital?  Well, if it is a mandatory 
contribution, the non-contributing member will likely find themselves in default and will 
be subject to all remedies available to the contributing member(s) under a default, which 
may involve the removal of the non-contributing member, among other things.  
Generally, the other members will have the right to contribute the non-contributing 
member’s portion and will then have the option to deal with the non-contributing member 
as needed.  If it is an optional contribution, generally, the other parties will have the right 
to contribute such non-contributed amount, and such amount will either be treated as a 
loan to the company or a loan to the non-contributing member.  This is sometimes 
referred to as a “member loan.”  While a member loan may take many names, shapes or 
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sizes, they are typically reimbursable prior to further distributions, sometimes directly by 
the non-contributing member and sometimes by the company.  They are generally subject 
to a very high rate of interest as well.  In some cases, the non-contributing member will 
not be allowed to receive any profits from the entity until such member loan is repaid.  
Depending on the nature of the loan agreement, the non-contributing member’s 
percentage interest in the entity may be reduced and the contributing member(s)’ 
percentage interest may be increased.  Such loans may be secured by the non-contributing 
member’s remaining interest in the entity. 
 
Now for the big question - who decides when an additional capital contribution is 
necessary and how much capital is required?  Unfortunately, the answer to this, like the 
answer to many contractual questions, is not black or white.  It is subject to negotiation, 
and hence, not easy to characterize.  But, since this paper is rooted in making 
characterizations about that which many industry experts have labeled 
“uncharactirizable,” why not stick my neck out a bit further?  It appears that “generally” 
(have you heard this word before in this paper?), I would even go so far as to say “very 
generally”, the decision making related to capital contributions is roughly proportionate 
to the members equity contributions in the project.  That is to say, when a member is 
responsible for “most” of the equity in a project (as is commonly the case for equity 
providers in these joint venture transactions), that member is likely to have “most” of the 
decision making power as it relates capital contributions.  How does one achieve “most” 
of the decision making power?  Another good question.  One whose answer might be 
different for different contractual terms that require varying decision making processes.  
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In this case, “most” of the decision making power might be defined as the ability to 
propose the timing and amount of the additional capital contribution, subject to 
“reasonable” member consent.  It might also, on the other hand, be defined by a scenario 
where another member (let’s say the sponsor, in a case where the sponsor is the managing 
member and the investor has contributed “most” of the capital) proposes the timing and 
amount of such additional capital contribution, but the investor has the right, in its “sole 
discretion,” to approve or deny such proposal.  In summary, “most” of the decision 
making power, for the purposes of this paper and this point anyway, is a situation where 
one party holds the overwhelming ability to control the nature of the outcome, yet they 
are at least in some small way dependent on the input of the other(s).  Again, generally, in 
the typical two-party joint venture, where the sponsor is the source of the transaction and 
the investor is the source of most of the equity, the investor would likely hold most of the 
control over this decision.  In many cases, however, as much as the investor has the 
ability to approve or deny such additional capital contribution, they are quite dependent 
on the sponsor to manage the financial day to day activities of the entity, and therefore 
will rely heavily on their recommendation as to these capital requirements.  Ultimately, 
the nature of this interdependence, while formalized contractually in various ways, boils 
down to how comfortable the investor is with the sponsor (as do many other control-
related issues). 
 
Different contracts will contain different levels of detail related to contingencies 
surrounding capital contributions.  Development projects will often contain more rigid 
guidelines here as well.  Capital contributions from the investor may be contingent on a 
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host of items, including but not limited securing the construction loan, an acceptable 
business plan, guarantees on construction completion and sponsor contribution from 
sponsor or principals of sponsor, securing all permits and licenses, satisfactory title 
insurance, and more.  Often times, investor capital contributions (and perhaps the deal in 
general) will be contingent on the investor’s approval of the sponsor’s source of funds.  
The investor wants to be sure that the sponsor’s principals, who may well be handling the 
day to day activities of the entity, are financially committed to the project.  Accordingly, 
there is often a minimum percentage of sponsor funds that must come directly from 
personal funds of the sponsor’s principals. 
 
Another important issue related to capital contributions is that of capital accounts.  
Generally, the agreement will describe procedures for maintaining a capital account for 
each member of the entity.  These guidelines will be in accordance with treasury 
regulations and will spell out the events which result in crediting or debiting of accounts.  
Generally, no withdrawals can be made and no interest is due on these accounts except as 
expressly provided in the contract.  Credits include the value of any cash or property 
contributions as well as any net income generated by the company and allocated to that 
member.  Any cash or property distributions as well as any net loss allocated to that 
member are generally charged against the account. 
 
Distributions 
The distributions section spells out the manner in which income to the entity will be 
distributed.  It governs the infamous cash flow “waterfall.”  Income is generally broken 
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down into two types – net operating proceeds and net capital proceeds.  Net operating 
proceeds are cash flows that result from the operations of the entity.  While they may be 
defined in various ways, generally, they consist of all operating receipts in excess of 
operating expenses, debt service, capital improvement expenditures and cash reserves.  
Net capital proceeds can be loosely defined as any proceeds from a sale, refinancing, 
insurance recovery, eminent domain award or similar capital event in excess of any debt 
that is due, any transaction costs or any necessary reserves.  Operating proceeds and 
capital proceeds may be distributed according to the same distribution plan, or they may 
be distributed differently.  In either case, this section will lay out the frequency of cash 
distributions, the method for compounding (interest is normally accrued to provide for 
cumulative returns) and the order in which capital will be repaid.  Further, it will define 
the returns applicable to all invested capital.  There are a variety of methods by which to 
distribute cash flow.  A detailed analysis of this methodology is contained in the chapter 
of this paper on returns.  The distribution section will also describe any necessary 
distribution withholdings as well as any legal restrictions on distributions. 
 
Tax Issues and Allocations of Profit and Loss 
Real estate LLC operating agreements will contain language addressing tax issues and 
allocations of profit and loss.  Common issues of concern include compliance with 
Treasury Regulations, regulatory and other allocations, minimum gain chargebacks, loss 
limitations, qualified income offsets, non-recourse deductions, and other adjustments and 
allocations, all of which are outside the scope of this paper.  Often, the agreement will 
identify a member to deal with tax matters, generally the managing member, who will be 
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responsible for preparing tax returns for the company (or causing such returns to be 
prepared), determining the appropriate treatment of income and loss, collecting tax 
information from other members as necessary to deal with Internal Revenue Code issues, 
and furnishing necessary tax information to other members.  The agreement will often 
spell out basic procedures to be followed by the tax matters member in carrying out such 
tasks. 
 
Accounting, Records, Reporting & Bank Accounts 
Operating agreements will generally have language dedicated to the LLC’s accounting 
practices, record keeping practices, reporting practices and bank accounts.  The 
agreement will typically define the accounting method to be followed, the entity’s fiscal 
year, who will maintain the company records (often the managing member) and where 
such records will be kept.  It will define any reports that are to be prepared and delivered 
to the other members and what the time frames are for delivery.  Reports that are 
commonly prepared and distributed include financial statements (balance sheets, profit 
and loss statements, cash flow statements and the like), leasing activity statements, 
budget analysis reports, property management reports, insurance-related reports, business 
plan revisions, and more.  The agreement may further define any audit rights possessed 
by LLC members as well as any cash management policies (the later being a critical 
control which is further explained in the next chapter).  The agreement may outline how 
and at what frequency project appraisals are to be completed as well. 
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Company Management and Membership 
This topic is an important one.  Under this section, the operating agreement will identify 
the manager and lay out its rights and obligations.  Generally, the manager of the LLC 
will be the central figure in making company decisions.  This doesn’t necessarily mean it 
will have the most decision making authority, but at the very least, it will play a major 
role in executing decisions once they have been made.  As with any LLC, the manager 
can be a non-member or member, as noted above.  In the typical sponsor-investor 
relationship, where the sponsor is to be active in the project and the investor has 
contributed most of the capital, the sponsor is often named as the manager (managing 
member) and strict restrictions are placed on its actions.    In this case, the managing 
member may have some authority to make small day-to-day decisions, but for the most 
part, they will be restricted to acting in accordance with mutually pre-approved business 
plans, operating and construction budgets, etc.  Further, many operating agreements will 
go as far as listing specific decisions that may not be made without prior consent of the 
investor.  These decisions, which will be further discussed in the next chapter, include  
financing decisions, sale decisions, contract decisions (often primarily related to 
construction, property management, leasing, etc), entitlement decisions, insurance 
decisions, legal decisions, acquisition decisions, accounting decisions, decisions related 
to major modifications in the entity itself (transfer of ownership, dissolution, etc.), any 
decisions that would either fall outside the agreed upon business plan or operating budget 
or would negatively impact the property in any way, etc.  And this list is not nearly 
comprehensive.  This method, while it requires active involvement and regular 
recommendations by the sponsor, most often places primary decision-making control in 
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the hands of the investor.  Similar to the capital decisions referenced earlier, as the 
sponsor’s capital contribution in a given project rises, there will often be a rise in the 
level of decision-making authority a sponsor will have.  Generally, the more “skin” the 
sponsor has “in the game,” and the more comfortable the investor is with the sponsor and 
its’ track record, the more leverage the sponsor will have in negotiating decision-making 
autonomy. 
 
Another business model that is not uncommon in joint venture real estate projects is one 
where the investor is named as the manager and the sponsor has some approval rights, 
depending on its’ contribution to the entity.  This model is typically used when the 
investor has in-house development or property management expertise and wishes to be a 
more active participant in the day-to-day operations of the project.  Sometimes the 
sponsor will step out of the management all-together and other times it will be more of a 
team effort.  Often, under this scenario, where the sponsor has a limited financial 
commitment to the project and has limited development or property management 
expertise, the sponsor will effectively yield most all of the decision making control to the 
investor. 
 
In addition to naming the manager and defining how primary decision making rights will 
be allocated, this section of the operating agreement will also outline the rights and roles 
of other members and limitations on liability of the manager and members.  Generally, a 
non-managing member has a limited role in the day-to-day activities of the entity except 
to provide its decision making authority as outlined by the document.  Further, in some 
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cases, non-managing members are prohibited from committing the company to any 
contracts or financial obligations or from acting as an agent on its behalf.   
 
The operating agreement will also lay out the expectations of the managing member and 
non-managing members pertaining to their time commitments to the company and their 
ability to be involved in competing projects (often allowed, but sometimes limited).  The 
agreement will look at compensation and expense reimbursement for both the manager 
and the non-managing members as well.  This can be a very important point.  While it is 
relatively common for most project expenses to be reimbursed by the company to the 
party making the expenditure, the amount and recipient of the development fee or 
property management fee are less systematic.  These and other fees are important to the 
transaction because they compensate the developer or property manager, as the case may 
be, for their time and resources spent on such tasks.  As the sponsor or investor may often 
serve in one or both of these capacities, this is commonly an important point of 
negotiation, particularly for a sponsor-developer who may rely on this fee for operational 
funding until they receive profits from the project (if they are so fortunate).  Fees that are 
commonly paid include acquisitions fees, development fees, property management fees 
and asset management fees.  Depending on the nature of the investor, sometimes 
underwriting fees or investment fees may be paid to them as well. 
 
This section of the agreement (in combination with other sections) will often outline 
procedures and timeframes to be followed in preparing annual or monthly business plans 
and budgets.  It also will typically lay out company policies regarding the hiring and 
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firing of company employees and contractors.  Often, this section will discuss company 
policies with respect to ERISA (Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) 
as well as procedures related to UBTI (unrelated business taxable income). 
 
Transfer and Assignment of Interests 
Operating agreements will typically address the issue of transferring interests in the LLC 
and the procedures for doing so.  Generally, transfers are not permitted without some 
level of approval by other members of the entity.  Sometimes transfers will be at the sole 
discretion of other members and other times members will only have “reasonable” 
approval rights.  Many times, certain transfers, known as permitted transfers, are 
permitted without the approval of other members.  Permitted transfers are more 
commonly available to the investor (particularly institutional investors), as their business 
models require more flexibility.  This section of the agreement will also address 
substitution of membership rights (which may be separate from interests in the rights to 
profits, losses, and distributions) and procedures for such substitutions.  Often, clauses 
providing purchase options and right of first refusal options to non-transferring members 
in the event another member wishes to transfer its interest are included as well.  This 
section will also likely address how admissions of new members will be handled. 
 
Withdrawal, Removal and Resignation 
Similar to transfers, noted above, withdrawals and resignations are often not permitted 
without prior consent of other members.  In many cases, a member’s request to resign or 
withdraw from the entity will trigger a buy-sell event or in some cases a default event, 
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depending on the nature of the withdrawal.  This section may also outline any events or 
actions that would justify removal of the managing member and any procedures 
surrounding such removal.  This issue is often addressed in the default section as well, as 
noted below. 
 
Dissolution and Termination 
This section of the agreement will address what events will trigger the dissolution of the 
company and the actions that will be taken upon dissolution.  Generally, the “winding 
up” of the entity is handled by the managing member and entails the liquidation of all 
company assets, satisfying the claims of all creditors and a final distribution of any 
remaining assets according to an agreed upon final distribution plan.  It is commonly 
triggered by the completion or early termination of a project. 
 
Defaults 
This section will typically define what events constitute a default on the part of the 
managing member or non-managing member(s).  These are commonly listed separately 
as they constitute a very different set of events.  Defaults by the managing member often 
include bankruptcy, fraud or gross negligence, a change in the ownership of the 
managing member resulting in the principal(s) no longer having a majority interest, a 
default under the loan documents, or simply a material failure to perform its duties.  A 
default on behalf of the investor may be triggered by such major events as bankruptcy, 
fraud, or withdrawal from the company.  As you might expect, default events by the 
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investor, at least under the common scenario where it is the majority owner and non-
manager, are not as constricting. 
 
Remedies for default include such items as restrictions on distributions, loss of 
membership rights, the triggering of a buy-sell event (to be addressed below) and other 
possible remedies available by law.  Further, the investor will often seek additional 
remedies which allow it to immediately remove the managing member as manager, 
replace it with another manager, or step in and act as manager itself.  It may also seek the 
right to terminate affiliates of the managing member as agents (brokerage, property 
management, etc.) as it sees fit. 
 
Third Party Sale 
This section will generally outline the procedures to be followed with respect to a third 
party sale.  Perhaps the most central issue here is when to in fact sell the property.  In 
many cases, the investor will have the unilateral ability to initiate a forced sale after what 
is commonly referred to as the “lockout period.”  A lockout period is simply a pre-
determined period of time within which neither party can force a sale or initiate the buy-
sell procedures discussed below.  A lockout period is commonly implemented as a 
mechanism by which to prevent the parties from removing themselves from the project or 
forcing a sale of the project during the critical early stages of an acquisition or 
development.  The idea behind it is that the parties to the agreement acknowledge that 
they are dependent on each other for the performance of certain functions in order to get 
the project to a point where they will collectively be able to realize the value of their 
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initial investment.  If either party removes themselves from the project prior to such time, 
it would be extremely damaging to the remaining members.  While lockout periods vary 
widely and are quite case-specific, a typical development lockout period might be defined 
as 24 to 36 months after the initial investment, or similarly, 12 months after substantial 
completion of construction. 
 
Barring a forced sale, this section would define what other events would result in the sale 
of the project.  Often this is tied to the term of the loan or the investment horizon of the 
investor. 
 
This section also typically describes the method of determining the ask price for the 
property, the minimum acceptable sale price and other terms of the sale.  Often, member 
consent is required for the determination of such items although, in many cases, the 
investor has the ability to make the final decision in the event of a disagreement.  Other 
times, a disagreement would trigger a buy-sell event or prompt some form of arbitration.  
This section will further define the method of responding to offers, timeframes for 
responding to offers and what level of consent is required for such responses. 
 
Often, the investor will hold very tight control over the sale process, and in the event the 
property is not sold in a timely fashion, or if the sponsor defaults in any way, the investor 
can initiate a forced sale over which they often have more or complete control of the 
process. 
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This section of the agreement will typically outline the broker selection process, the 
process for negotiating the terms of the brokerage agreement, and the process for 
implementing price reductions in the event the property does not sell at the original ask 
price.  The agreement will also typically outline reporting procedures here with respect to 
the sale, as well as rights and procedures related to tax-free exchanges that members may 
wish to pursue. 
 
Buy-Sell 
Generally, all real estate operating agreements will contain some sort of buy-sell 
language.  The term “buy-sell” is an industry accepted label for what can be a fairly 
complicated process.  However, the concept is really quite simple.  It is basically the 
process by which joint equity holders in an asset engage in and execute a purchase or sale 
of the other’s interest in that asset.  This section of an operating agreement will spell out 
when buy-sell proceedings may be initiated, the procedures that must be followed in 
order to do so and any other issues surrounding the buy-sell rights. 
 
With respect to timing, there is often a lockout period, similar to that described above, 
within which buy-sell proceedings may not be initiated (although in some cases an 
impasse or default my trigger buy-sell provisions prematurely).  After such lockout 
period, buy-sell proceedings can often be initiated by either party – again, sometimes as a 
result of an impasse or a default, and other times for any reason, simply as a result of one 
party wishing to withdraw its’ interest in the entity. 
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In its’ simplest form, a buy-sell event might evolve as follows:  First, the member 
initiating the buy-sell procedures will deliver an “offer notice” to the other member.  The 
offer notice will normally contain the offering members’ determination of fair market 
value of the company’s assets (the buy-out amount) as well as other pre-determined items 
that may include the proposed date of closing, etc.  Once received by the non-offering 
member, the non-offering member may either elect to sell its’ interest in the project at the 
offer price, or alternatively, it may elect to buy the offering members’ interest at the same 
price.  Also, once received, the non-offering member must respond with its intent within 
some predetermined period of time, or, generally, it will have been deemed to have 
accepted such offer and will be required to sell its’ interest within the allotted timeframe.  
The provisions will normally outline the closing process, the method for determining fair-
market-value (which varies significantly), schedule and location, the treatment and pro-
ration of taxes, the treatment of any rents due and any other necessary adjustments.  The 
provisions will also normally lay out any remedies for non-performance.  These often 
include dissolution, loss of deposits, a discounted purchase by the performing member, as 
well as other remedies including specific performance.  Another important concern is 
whether the purchasing member will be acquiring the selling members’ membership 
interest or direct ownership of the entity’s assets themselves.  Sometimes this is 
predetermined and other times the purchasing member may make this election.  Push-put 
language, which is quite similar to buy-sell language, often addresses this issue more 
specifically.  Push-put language, which differs from buy-sell language in that it generally 
mandates that one party either buy or sell another party’s interest at a given time or 
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within a given period, often implies a purchase or sale of a membership interest, whereas 
buy-sell language often refers to the purchase or sale of the entities underlying assets.  
 
Representations and Warrantees 
The primary intention of this section is to assure the investor that all information 
provided by the sponsor, upon which the investor has made the decision to invest its 
equity, its true and accurate to the best of the sponsor’s knowledge.  While the investor 
will sometimes provide a small set of representations (generally related to the fact that it 
has the full legal capacity to perform its obligations under the operating agreement), the 
vast majority of this section is dedicated to representations of the sponsor.  The sponsor 
will often make representations that the following issues (among others) have been 
appropriately dealt with: 
• Sponsor’s authority and capacity to perform its obligations under the operating 
agreement 
• Utilities and other services to the project 
• Licenses, permits and approvals for the project 
• Environmental status and hazardous waste as it relates to the project 
• Personnel and expertise of sponsor 
• Due diligence documentation 
• Pending or threatened condemnation or litigation 
• Title to the property 
• Property financial statements 
• Property-related agreements and contracts (brokerage, etc.) 
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• Property-related insurance information 
• Other legal matters 
 
Insurance and Indemnification 
The operating agreement will generally outline the insurance to be carried by the 
company with respect to construction, development, maintenance and operation of the 
project.  Sometimes this “insurance plan” is included within the body of the agreement 
and other times it is provided under separate cover.  Typically, it will describe the nature 
of the coverage, who is responsible for obtaining and maintaining such policies and 
which parties shall be named as additional insured.  The operating agreement will also 
describe limitations on liability and indemnifications.  This typically protects the 
members and managing member from liability so long as such parties continue to act in 
good faith.  Further, members are generally not personally liable for debts, liabilities and 
obligations of the company outside of their committed capital. 
 
Dispute Resolution 
Sometimes the operating agreement will spell out specific resolutions to specific disputes 
or conflicts throughout the document (therefore requiring no specific dispute resolution 
section).  Other times, there will be a section that specifically addresses how certain 
disputes will be handled.  Often, the method of preference is arbitration (sometimes 
binding and sometimes not).  In the event the parties have elected to include arbitration 
language, this section will spell out the arbitration procedures, how an arbitrator will be 
selected, and the binding (or non-binding) nature of the arbitration process.  This section 
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may further spell out the parties’ rights to file applications for relief with a court of 
appropriate jurisdiction.  Dispute resolution is a critical control-related point within a 
joint venture partnership.  When a specific section of an operating agreement does not 
exist to spell out certain dispute resolution methods, the agreement will generally have 
dealt with it inherently in other ways.  These might involve buy-sell rights, third-party 
sale triggers, defaults and remedies, etc. 
 
Miscellaneous 
Generally, operating agreements have a miscellaneous section which covers many points 
that don’t fit naturally in other places.  This section typically addresses short 
administrative or legal issues which are common to many contracts.  These clauses 
include notices, successors and assigns, amendments, no waiver, litigation, entire 
agreement, captions and references, counterparts, applicable law, etc. 
 
Common Exhibits 
Operating agreements will also commonly have an exhibit section which contains 
separate documents that are commonly referenced within the agreement itself or other 
documentation that is too long to fit cohesively within the context of the regular 
agreement.  Exhibit items often include (but are not limited to) the following: 
• Names, addresses and contributions of members 
• Description of the subject real estate 
• Project business plan 
• Property budget 
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• Acquisition and development budget 
• Appraisal procedures 
• Agreements with third parties (brokerage, development, management, etc.) 
• Schedule of reimbursements to the parties 
• Guarantee agreements 
• Property financial statements 
• Operating agreements for affiliated holding companies 
• Environmental information 
• Cash management policies 
• Rent roll and owners reports 
• Other policies and procedures 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 - PRIMARY GOVERNANCE ISSUES 
Operating Properties 
While joint venture operating agreements can be very extensive and address many subtle 
details governing the sponsor-investor relationship, six major issues have emerged as the 
most critical to the joint venture process.  These issues govern the primary direction of 
the project and ultimately have the most influence on its success.  It is through the 
governance of these issues that control of the project is primarily allocated.  The issues 
outlined in this section are generally consistent throughout the spectrum of real estate 
product types (office, industrial, retail, residential, hotel) and risk profiles (core, core 
plus, value-added, opportunistic, development).  In the next section will look at issues 
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that are more specific to ground-up development deals, but for now we will focus on 
operating projects.  The issues are as follows: 
• Financing & Capital Structure 
• Cash Management 
• Leasing 
• Investment Horizon 
• Dispute Resolution and Defaults 
• Administrative Issues 
 
Let’s look at each of these in a little more detail.  For clarity of explanation and in order 
to establish a starting point from which to observe how these issues are controlled, we 
will again focus on the typical bilateral (sponsor-investor) joint venture situation where 
the sponsor will handle the day to day operations of the project and the investor will 
provide the vast majority of the equity. 
 
This, again, sets up the important point that decision-making control has a positive 
correlation with the amount of equity an investor has placed in a project.  For example, in 
a typical joint venture situation, where the investor holds a 90% initial interest and the 
sponsor holds a 10% initial interest, we would expect the investor to have the majority 
(perhaps 90%) of the decision making authority.  The sponsor may very well make 
recommendations and execute the decisions, but it is quite likely that the investor will 
hold the reins.  So, what we will look for below is how the investor will achieve its 
desired level of control. 
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First, it is important to understand the key mechanisms by which control is allocated and 
shared between the parties.  There are several common scenarios that dictate control 
allocation.  The first is a scenario where one party has the contractual right to make a 
unilateral decision.  That is, no input from any other party is needed in order to make the 
decision.  The second is one where a party has the contractual right to make a decision, 
however, that decision must be approved by another party or parties.  In this situation, 
control will be governed by the nature of the approval.  If the other party has the right to 
approve or deny such decision, in its sole discretion, than the original party’s right to 
make a decision is really more or less the ability to propose a recommendation upon 
which the other party will decide.  If the other party has the right to approve the decision 
in its reasonable judgment (reasonable approval), than it must practice reasonable 
discretion with respect to such decision and could only deny such decision if it were 
justifiably unreasonable.  This shifts much of the decision-making authority back to the 
original decision-maker and results in a more evenly shared control capacity.   
 
These mechanisms depict a few of the technical methods through which contractual 
control is allocated.  It should be noted, however, that there are a variety of other ways to 
do this.  Further, there may be factors outside those which have been addressed in the 
contract itself which would encourage a party to act a certain way under a certain set of 
circumstances.  Again, decision-making control, regardless of the contractual mechanism 
that attempts to allocate it, is best described as the overwhelming ability to control the 
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nature of an outcome.  It is this “overwhelming ability,” regardless of its origin, that one 
should look for. 
 
Financing and Capital Structure 
This issue deals with sourcing and securing capital for a given project.  Many joint 
venture projects will lever the equity interests by securing debt financing.  Debt financing 
comes in many shapes and sizes, from traditional mortgage loans, to construction 
financing, to mezzanine debt (discussed in more detail below).  Equity partners in a joint 
venture must decide how much debt to obtain, what type of debt to use, who the lender 
should be, what the terms of the loan(s) will be, and what type of recourse the lenders 
will have against the equity partners.  The debt will have to be paid off over time with 
some type of debt service payments, which will burden the operating cash flow and 
ultimately add risk to the investment.  Further, the debt will likely be secured by the real 
estate or the assets of the entity and will take a senior position to the equity interest with 
respect to distributions. 
 
In addition, the equity partners must decide who will have equity interests in the project 
and what the priority of their claim will be (see return structures below).  In an effort to 
make sure the best financing decisions are made, it is common that the front end work, at 
least with respect to debt capital, is done by the party with the most expertise in this area.  
Many times the investor will be responsible for handling the debt identification process, 
and still other times, it will be left to the sponsor.  If the investor is not responsible for 
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securing the debt itself, at a bare minimum it will have the right to approve, often in its 
sole discretion, the decisions related to debt sourcing and implementation. 
 
The equity component is often resolved a bit differently.  In many cases, the sponsors 
will have sourced the opportunity and therefore will have more leverage in determining 
how the equity will be structured.  As soon as the sponsor decides to bring in a majority 
investor, however, that majority investor (particularly if it is an overwhelming majority 
investor) will likely wield most of the decision-making control with respect to equity 
allocations moving forward.  At the outset, of course, this allocation is a function of the 
partners’ original agreement. 
 
Cash Management 
Managing inflows and outflows of cash to and from the project is also of critical 
importance.  With respect to cash flows, the investor is interested in making sure that 
inflows are credited and deposited appropriately and that cash outflows are only made on 
necessary items.  There are two common mechanisms through which the investor 
controls cash flows and yet still affords the sponsor ample flexibility to handle the day-to-
day financial operations of the project.  The first is the project budget.  At the outset of 
the venture, the investor will often require that the sponsor submit a business plan and 
budget for the property.  In the case of an operating property, the budget is an “operating 
budget” and it would include a line-item pro-forma of all expected costs for a given time 
period (typically annual).  This budget generally requires the approval of all partners and 
is used as a benchmark throughout the operating period from which the sponsor can make 
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financial commitments.  Often, for example, so long as the sponsor only spends money 
on items included in the operating budget, and so long as such expenses are within a pre-
determined range (typically within 5% of the budgeted amount, with a maximum dollar 
amount cap), the sponsor is free to make financial commitments.  In the event of an 
expense that is either outside the budget or above the pre-determined 5% limit or dollar 
amount cap, investor approval is often required. 
 
A second common tool is the “cash management policy.”  Many investors will establish 
clear guidelines regulating the logistical flow of money.  Cash management policies are 
sometimes written into the operating agreements themselves and sometimes attached as 
an exhibit to the operating agreement.  In either case, they will spell how many project 
bank accounts will be established, what bank will hold the accounts, how the bank is 
selected, and who has authority to access and monitor the accounts. For example, an 
investor may require that a joint venture project have four accounts, one to handle 
operational inflows, one to handle operational outflows, one to handle construction 
inflows (funding from equity and debt providers), and one to handle construction 
outflows.  The sponsor may only have access to the operational outflow account for 
expenses that fall within the pro-forma guidelines.  The banking institution may be 
required to notify the investor in the event of any withdrawal requests in excess of the 
pre-established limits.  Often times the investor will have the unilateral ability to select 
the banking institution to be used. 
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Leasing 
Leasing is another critical issue.  In order to maximize the value of many real estate 
projects, the most advantageous leasing scenarios must be pursued.  Quite often, the 
investor will require that a “lease-up” pro-forma be provided by the sponsor as part of the 
business plan.  This will outline the anticipated schedule of lease-up activities, the costs 
of such activities, and the types of tenants, rents and other business terms that will be 
pursued.  Like the operating budget, the lease-up pro-forma will be approved by the 
equity partners and so long as the sponsor stays within the guidelines (the proverbial 
“box”), it is generally free to make decisions.  Often however, large leases or leases with 
unique requirements that may somehow affect the value of the project will often require 
investor approval.  Many times, the leasing guidelines will require that the investor 
actually sign all leases (or leases that meet certain criteria), which obviously affords the 
investor an inherent approval opportunity. 
 
Investment Horizon 
The investment horizon, which refers to the length of time the project is expected to last, 
or more specifically, the anticipated life of the equity providers’ capital investments, is a 
tremendously important issue. 
 
Often, the investor, which may be an institution (as discussed earlier in the paper) with an 
obligation to return its investable capital to its own investors after some period of time, 
will be quite limited in its investment horizon.  So much so, that they will often only 
pursue opportunities with sponsors who have projects that fit their timing needs.  
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Opportunity funds, for example, are often closed-end funds with a five to seven year 
window (this varies depending on the fund) within which to pursue investment 
opportunities.  After this “investment period,” the capital must be returned to its 
investors.  Further, investors may require the flexibility to withdraw from the project 
prior to the completion of the originally scheduled project term.  This need for flexibility 
is a result of many investor concerns, ranging from the need to liquidated and satisfy 
other financial obligations to simply protecting the fund from over-exposure to a certain 
market segment.  On the other hand, an investor does not want to be compelled to sell at 
the whim of the sponsor either.  The investor has devoted significant resources in placing 
capital in the project and it wants to keep the money invested long enough to recognize 
the best possible financial return. 
 
The sponsor, too, is concerned about investment horizon.  A sponsor may be in a 
completely different financial position or business phase than the investor.  The sponsor, 
for example, may wish to hold a certain property as an income property for an extended 
time (say 10 years), while the investor must withdraw its money after five years, or vise 
versa.  This inherent and common inconsistency has resulted in the creation of 
mechanisms by which equity partners with different investment horizons may achieve 
their desired investment life. 
 
In our base situation, where the investor holds a majority ownership interest and the 
sponsor is managing the day-to-day activities of the project, it is the investor who will 
often require more stringent language surrounding its investment life.  The first way the 
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investor can do this is by causing a third party sale of the underlying real estate and 
dissolving the project entity.  As addressed in the Third Party Sale section above, the 
investor will often have the unilateral right to cause a third party sale after a possible 
lockout period.  This wouldn’t necessarily prevent the sponsor from acquiring the 
investor’s interest, or bringing in another investor to acquire such interests, however, it 
does provide the investor the ability to withdraw. 
 
A second way that the investor can control its investment horizon is through a buy-sell 
clause or a “push-put” provision.  While buy-sell language (contrary to push-put or call-
put language) does not mandate the behavior (buy versus sell) of the parties, it often can 
be written in such a way as to effectively serve that purpose.  For example, if the sponsor 
does not have the financial wherewithal to purchase the investor’s interest, and the buy-
sell provision mandates a quick transaction process which does not afford the sponsor 
adequate time to secure external funding, the investor can be fairly confident that by 
initiating the buy-sell provision, it will have the ability to acquire the sponsor’s interest.  
Once it has done so, it would further have the right to cause a third party sale as it sees fit. 
 
As the implications of the provisions that surround investment horizon are substantial, 
this is, as you might expect, a very heavily negotiated issue.  As indicated earlier, one of 
the most critical issues in pursuing one of the disposition strategies mentioned here is the 
time it takes to consummate a sale once the process has been initiated (be it third party 
sale, push-put, or by-sell).  It is not uncommon for the investor to want to sell quickly in 
 53
order to take advantage of a good market, while the sponsor may want to delay the 
process in order to secure a new funding source.   
 
Regardless of the outcome of this negotiation, the investment horizon (for the most part, 
and particularly on behalf of the investor) is selected with the intention of maximizing the 
return on the equity investment.  If the investor believes that it can achieve a better IRR 
by shortening the holding period and selling a property in a “hot” market, it will likely be 
inclined to do so.  Alternatively, if growth opportunities appear more attractive, it may 
desire to hold the property for a longer period. 
 
As noted in the Third Party Sale section above, other guidelines may be inserted in the 
operating agreement that regulate the intended investment horizon by tying a third party 
sale and entity dissolution to the term of the senior loan or the investor’s target 
investment termination date.  While the intended project term is important, it is often the 
possibility of deviations, and the governing of such deviations (third party sale, buy-sell, 
push-put), that warrant more focused attention. 
 
Dispute Resolution and Defaults 
While operating agreements are designed to provide direction under many potential 
scenarios, they will nonetheless require that the equity partners to a particular project 
agree on certain items in order to move forward.  But what if the parties just can’t agree?  
Well, from this question grew a set of mechanisms intended to resolve these 
disagreements.  In the case of a dispute, which might loosely be defined as a situation 
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where a decision needs to be made and the equity partners cannot agree on what that 
decision should be, there are a host of ways that operating agreements will govern the 
decision-making process.  Certain issues, depending on their level of significance, will 
warrant more or less complex resolution methods.  In many cases, if after some pre-
determined period of time, a decision cannot be reached, the document will simply pass 
unilateral authority to one of the equity partners.  Other times, the dispute, sometimes 
referred to as an “impasse,” will be sent to arbitration proceedings, where a third party 
will be called in to help facilitate a decision.  Often, as noted earlier, this arbitration 
process will be spelled out comprehensively in the agreement.  Generally, the arbitration 
language will identify the parties that are qualified to act as the mediator and identify 
timeframes within which the process must be completed and the ultimate decision must 
be made.  In some cases, arbitration will result in a binding decision.  Other times, if the 
dispute remains unresolved after such proceedings, one party will retain the unilateral 
ability to make the decision.  In many situations, however, if a dispute remains 
unresolved after arbitration, the prolonged “impasse” will automatically trigger a buy-sell 
event.  In any case, the language surrounding dispute resolution plays a critical role in 
shaping the nature of control allocation and ultimately the allocation of risk. 
 
Defaults and their associated remedies are also a critical issue for investors and sponsors 
alike.  Both parties are dependant on the other to fulfill certain obligations throughout the 
life of the project.  Accordingly, they need to know that if those obligations are not 
fulfilled, they will have the ability to fix it.  While the reasonable inclusion of defaults 
and remedies is important to all parties, the investor will perhaps pay more attention to it 
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because, as the saying goes, they often have “more to lose,” particularly in the case of a 
substantial institutional investor (like a pension fund) where their financial wherewithal 
would make them a likely target in the case of pursuit by a creditor.  Accordingly, the 
ability of an investor to remedy a default by the sponsor, particularly as it may related to 
the entities’ non-performance under a loan agreement, can often serve as the investor’s 
primary means of limiting its financial and legal exposure.   
 
Administrative Issues 
While most of the core joint venture issues are directly tied to the performance of the real 
estate, there are some important issues that are more related to the governance of the 
project entity itself.  These issues include any mergers, reorganizations or dissolutions of 
the entity, the admission, withdrawal or change of any member or manager, and any 
changes to the governance of the entities ongoing operations.  Quite often, all major 
decisions related to entity management will require investor approval, which approval 
may either be granted at the investor’s sole or reasonable discretion, depending on the 
nature of the situation. 
 
Development Projects 
From an investment perspective, the primary difference between an operating property 
and a development project is the addition of the construction phase, prior to stabilization, 
when the project will likely require a series of cash outflows.  Development projects 
share many of the same core issues described above, but there is an additional set of 
issues created by the need to control for financial and operational variables throughout 
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the construction phase.  While there are a host of new issues that must be addressed in a 
development project, four issues have emerged as the primary control-related variables.  
They are as follows: 
• Contractor Control 
• Construction Process 
• Capital Calls/Cash management 
 
With respect to contractor control, majority investors will want control over who the 
contractors are, how and why they are hired (bidding, etc.) and fired (non-performance, 
etc.), how they are held accountable for their work (bonding, etc.), as well as the work 
they will be required to do.  With respect to the construction process itself (preliminary 
through completion), investors will want control over design elements, plan approval, and 
very importantly, change orders.  Change orders can be tremendously costly and often 
require specific controls like itemized dollar cost limits above which specific investor 
approval will be required.  Entitlements, which are really a pre-construction item, often 
require a separate set of controls, as well.  Some investors will take entitlement risk and 
some simply will not.  Entitlements, if not yet secured, are a key element of development 
risk and will warrant careful procedural controls. 
 
Capital calls and cash management for development projects require careful attention as 
well.  Separate development accounts are often established for development inflows and 
outflows, much the same way operating and construction accounts are created for 
 57
operating properties.  Due to the nature and size of the outflows, investors will often 
retain complete control over distributions related to development and construction. 
 
Wrapping up Risk Allocation 
Regardless of whether a project is operational or development in nature, a critical 
intention of its operating agreement is to allocate risk (by way of allocating governance 
authority) and set financial incentives for both the sponsor and investor, so that their 
interests will generally be aligned and they will attempt to act in the collective best 
interest.  Through careful observation of risk allocation in joint venture control provisions 
across the spectrum of low-risk core investments to high-risk development projects (and 
several in between), it appears that the level of control demanded by an investor does not 
necessarily change with projects of more or less risk.  In stead, the amount of issues that 
need to be controlled for increases.  The highest increase in controllable issues is seen in 
ground-up development projects, where the entire pre-stabilization construction process 
must be dealt with.  Further, as noted previously for a variety of specific governance 
issues, it appears that the level of control demanded by investors increases as their level 
of investment in the project (as a percentage of total equity) increases. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: EQUITY RETURN STRUCTURE 
Returns and the Capital Stack 
The return structure of real estate deals is perhaps the most central issue of the joint 
venture concept.  Investors and sponsors alike base their investment decisions largely on 
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expected project returns.  While the concept of returns is a simple one, the structural 
complexity of returns for any given project is only limited by the creativity of those that 
craft the joint venture agreement.  Accordingly, there are numerous methods used 
commonly in practice.  The fundamentals, however, are relatively consistent and can be 
broken down systematically. 
 
Before looking at return structure itself, let’s break for a moment to review another 
“structural” issue – the issue of capital structure.  Like in the world of corporate finance, 
capital structure within the real estate world refers to the sources of capital for a 
particular project.  These sources can be organized according to their level of priority to 
form the traditional “capital stack.”  Priority, in this context, relates to the level of 
security of an investment from the investor’s perspective (i.e. how likely is it that you 
will get your money back and/or achieve your desired return).  The two primary 
investment types (which are sources of cash from the sponsors perspective), of course, 
are debt and equity – debt instruments being more secure than equity instruments as debt 
has a senior claim to the assets (it gets paid back before the equity does). As the capital 
markets have grown more sophisticated, so have the availability and nature of debt and 
equity products.  The result has been more complex and often more densely populated 
capital stacks.  For this paper of course, we will focus on the equity component of the 
capital stack.   
 
The equity component of a real estate project can be divided and classified in a host of 
ways, much the way stocks of a public company can be divided and classified.  Again, 
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for the purposes of this paper, we will look specifically at the joint venture relationship, 
where a small group of participants (typically two), divide and classify the equity interest 
between them.  Under this relationship, two types of equity interests prevail.  That is, two 
different equity slices that become a part of the capital stack.  The first is what we will 
call straight “preferred equity.”  The second is what we will call “participating equity.”  
While they share some common characteristics, there are several clear differentiating 
factors. 
 
Preferred Equity 
Let’s start with straight preferred equity.  This is an equity interest in a project where the 
bearer contributes capital which is paid back over a predetermined period of time at a 
fixed rate of return, much like a fixed interest rate on a loan.  This return is called a 
“preferred return,” as it is paid ahead of other equity components.  It looks and feels so 
much like a loan, however, that some industry experts actually refer to it as mezzanine 
debt or “mezz debt.”  Obviously this can be terribly confusing, especially since true 
mezzanine debt is perhaps more common in real estate capital stacks (as part of the debt 
component however) than preferred equity.  Don’t be mistaken though.  It is not debt.  It 
is equity that behaves almost exactly like a loan.  Why not just make it debt then?  Well, 
obviously there are some reasons, otherwise we probably would.  The real answer to this 
question from a financial perspective lies in the capital provider’s assessment of the risk-
return characteristics of the deal.  If a capital provider feels that a project is riskier than it 
would prefer, it may elect to provide mezzanine debt in order to secure a lien on the 
subject assets and keep itself at a more senior position in the capital stack.  This 
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effectively provides a loss-buffer, where the property would have to lose enough value to 
wipe out all the equity before cutting into the value of the mezzanine debt.  On the other 
hand, if a capital provider feels that a project is sufficiently secure so that the risk-
adjusted return that can be achieved through a preferred equity interest (where the rate of 
return will likely be higher than in a mezzanine loan) in a project is more attractive than 
that of a mezzanine loan, the capital provider may elect to pursue a preferred equity 
interest.  The tax implications of an equity versus a debt investment are also an important 
consideration for many investors. 
 
Participating Equity 
The second and more common type of equity is participating equity.  Unlike straight 
preferred equity, participating equity, as its name implies, participates in profits above the 
preferred return.  Often, the bearer will share in a preferred return, but once the preferred 
return hurdles are met (as will be discussed below), the bearer will also have a claim to 
the residual profits. 
 
The most basic participating equity structure is one where the equity partners (generally 
the members to the governing LLC) share the profits on a “pari passu” basis according to 
their initial membership interests until a predetermined IRR has been achieved by the 
investor.  After this “return hurdle” has been met, the sponsor will likely be “promoted.”  
This term refers to the action of increasing the sponsor’s share of the residual profits it 
will receive (obviously, this means the other members’ shares will decrease accordingly).  
The amount of increase is called the “promote.”  While the promote is often described in 
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terms of a percentage increase, there is not an industry-wide consensus with respect to its 
technical definition and how it is actually calculated.  The most technically correct (non-
quantitative) answer defines the promote as the percentage interest given up by the 
investor and contributed to the sponsor after meeting a pre-determined hurdle, thereby 
enhancing the sponsors’ claim to residual profits. 
 
Quite commonly there will be more than one IRR hurdle and more than one promote 
scenario.  For example, the members may split profits pari passu according to their initial 
membership interests, say 90/10 in favor of the investor, until the first IRR hurdle, say 
10%, is achieved.  After that, the members may split profits 80/20 in favor of the investor 
(a 10% increase for the sponsor, the amount of which is the sponsor’s promote) until the 
investor has achieved a 15% IRR.  Then, after this hurdle has been met, the members 
may split the profits 70/30 in favor of the investor (increasing the sponsor’s promote) 
until the investor has achieved a 20% IRR, and so on.  Each of these different profit split 
scenarios represents a different return “tier.”  Sometimes these tiers are referred to as 
different “profit percentages.”  For example, the members might refer to the revised splits 
within the first promoted scenario (after the first IRR hurdle has been met) as the “first 
profit percentages.”  The next promoted scenario, after the second IRR hurdle has been 
met, would be referred to as the “second profit percentages.” 
 
A common variation to the simple participating equity model is one where the concept of 
“carried interest” or a “carried distribution” is incorporated.  This concept provides for 
the sponsor to take a percentage of the profits, after a given hurdle has been met, even 
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before the promoted splits are paid.  The profit percentage that is taken “off the top” is 
referred to as carried interest or a carried distribution.  To illustrate this, let’s expand the 
example above to incorporate this concept.  In this case, after the initial IRR hurdle of 
10% is hit, the sponsor would be paid a carried distribution before splitting the profits 
according to the promoted split scheme.  A typical carried distribution in this case may be 
20%.  So, upon achieving the 10% IRR, the sponsor would be paid 20% off the top of all 
additional profits, and the remaining 80% would be split 80/20.  This scheme would hold 
true until the investor hit the next return hurdle of 15%, after which the sponsor might be 
paid another carried distribution of 30% off the top of all remaining profits and the rest 
would be split 70/30 until the next IRR hurdle was achieved by the investor.  In many 
cases, carried interest is collect by the sponsor, but in order for the sponsor to keep all 
carried interest, the investor must maintain its negotiated return levels throughout the 
close of the transaction.  If, for example, the property was sold and capital proceeds were 
not sufficient for the investor to maintain the IRR’s achieved throughout the deal, the 
sponsor would likely have to contribute additional capital (out of its carried interest 
funds) until the investor again hit its required return level. 
 
Another common twist (although less common than the carried interest scheme), is the 
concept of a “current promote.”  This concept allows the sponsor to collect a promote 
from current operating income prior to the investor achieving its’ required return.  This 
structure is generally set up to focus the sponsor on achieving a satisfactory level of 
current income with less emphasis on the back-end promote that would be more 
indicative of a value-added type of opportunity where capital appreciation was the focus. 
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Negotiating the variables 
There are a host of other variations to these models.  The concepts outlined above, as well 
as other less traditional concepts, are tailored in various ways to meet the needs of 
investors and sponsors alike as they negotiate terms for different projects.  In any case, 
the participating structure, with IRR hurdles, promotes and carried distributions, which 
looks much like the carried interest structure common in the private equity industry, is 
designed to fairly “incentivize” and compensate the equity partners.  This structure 
provides a mechanism by which the investor can achieve its desired returns (as a function 
of the preferred return and IRR hurdles negotiated into the agreement) and the sponsor 
has adequate incentive to maximize the returns of project (as it will benefit from the 
promote(s) negotiated into an agreement). 
 
The key negotiated variables under this participating equity model are of course the 
return hurdles, the profit percentages (the promoted splits), and the carried interest 
payments.  Sponsors, as you might expect, will attempt to maximize the promote and 
minimize the time it takes to get “into the promote” by minimizing the preferred returns 
and hurdles.  Investors, on the other hand, will try to maximize their returns and minimize 
the promote to the sponsor which ultimately maximizes their claim to residual profits and 
enhances their total return.   
 
In addition to maximizing their total return, equity providers will commonly attempt to 
set some sort of a minimum profit amount.  This ensures that the equity provider 
receives, at a bare minimum, enough profit from the transaction to make the investment 
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worth their time in the event of an untimely disposition or other unplanned circumstance.  
Sometimes this is defined as a dollar amount and other times it is a percentage tied to 
capital contribution.  Further, equity providers may set a “minimum equity multiplier,” 
which effectively will limit the amount of residual profits that can be earned by a sponsor 
prior to the investor achieving their target multiplier. 
 
There are advantages and disadvantages to both primary equity structures (preferred and 
participating) from both the sponsor’s and investor’s perspective.  For the sponsor, the 
straight preferred equity model limits the sharing of residual profits with the investor, 
which can be a huge benefit.  On the other hand, it typically will require that the sponsor 
pay a higher preferred return on the invested capital, making it more difficult to get into 
the residual profits.  For the investor, preferred equity is less risky because it gets repaid 
before the remaining equity and provides a loss-buffer much like mezzanine debt.  
Further, it generally offers a higher current preferred return.  However, with no back-end 
upside profit potential, the total return to the investor from the project under this model is 
limited to the negotiated preferred return.  Participating equity is riskier, but may offer 
better total return potential.  Again, it boils down to the party’s assessment of the 
project’s risk-return profile and what their goals are for that particular investment.  In 
many cases today, as a result of the extremely competitive acquisition environment, many 
investors are forced to consider preferred equity interests in cases where they normally 
wouldn’t simply because that is the only way they will be able to get into some of the 
deals on the market. 
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The governance provisions surrounding these different equity structures will vary as well.  
Often, investors in preferred equity positions will require less direct decision-making 
control because they are in a more secure position.  The parties’ equity positions may also 
affect the nature of other financing for the project.  For example, some funds (opportunity 
or otherwise), which might otherwise source the primary debt for the project and provide 
some recourse for the lenders, may not do so under the preferred equity structure.  With 
no back-end upside opportunities, they may not be willing to expose themselves to that 
additional risk.  While the sponsor often has a “bigger box” to work within before the 
preferred equity provider can step in to make decisions, the sponsor will also often be 
responsible for sourcing and securing such debt. 
 
Like the other key points in the operating agreement, return structures are highly 
negotiated and highly variable.  In particular, the return structure appears to be 
endogenous with the governance structure.  Different sponsors and different investors 
have different motivations and different points of leverage in every situation.  The result 
is a huge diversity in structural techniques across the spectrum of joint venture real estate 
projects. 
 
Order of Distributions 
As noted earlier, the returns earned by the parties to a project are generally governed in 
the distributions section of the operating agreement.  The distributions section will 
outline the administration of such payments, the most critical aspect of which is the order 
in which profits are paid (as this ultimately determines the nature of the equity interest).  
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Quite often this section will simply list the order of priority in which payments will be 
made.  As noted in the previous chapter, distributions will sometimes be ordered 
differently for operating proceeds and capital proceeds.  Also, sometimes an investor will 
require full payment before a sponsor even sees a dollar.  But while the distribution plans 
coincide with the splits and return hurdles mentioned earlier (which may vary widely), 
there may be subtle differences in payment priority as well.  For example, some 
agreements may call for all member loans and additional capital contributions to be 
repaid prior to the initial capital contributions.  Further, they may call for all returns to be 
paid before capital is repaid.  Others will not differentiate between these items.  Many 
agreements will also contain what is known as “clawback” language, which allows one or 
more equity partners to claim cash from a capital event in order to pay themselves back 
for past unachieved returns before any other current returns are paid. 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Summary of Findings and Thoughts on Further Study 
This paper has taken a focused look at joint venture real estate projects and the return 
structures and control provisions that govern the equity investments behind them.  
Further, it has looked carefully at the bilateral sponsor-investor relationship that lies at 
the heart of many of these projects.  Through the creation of a project-level entity 
(typically an LLC) and the formulation of the operating agreement that governs that 
entity, the equity partners in these real estate transactions are able to formalize their 
relationship.  Guided by the operating agreement, this relationship is characterized 
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largely by the allocation of decision-making control, which is a direct determinant of risk 
allocation. 
 
In looking at contractual control allocation, this paper explores the 18 primary 
components of joint venture operating agreements and further outlines the six critical 
governance issues that tend to define the nature of the projects’ decision-making control 
profile.  Further, the paper explores the primary additional governance concerns that 
emerge in ground-up development projects versus those that are common throughout the 
majority of real estate joint ventures – operating and development alike. 
 
In addition to the analysis of governance issues, this paper looks closely at the equity 
return structures that are common in modern real estate practice.  It further explores the 
typical negotiated variables within those return structures as well as the common methods 
of distribution. 
 
In light of this analysis, this paper offers the following seven conclusions: 
• There are six primary governance issues that transcend most joint venture 
operating agreements, regardless of product type or risk profile of the underlying 
real estate.  These include financing and capital structure, cash management, 
leasing, investment horizon, dispute resolution and defaults, and certain 
administrative issues. 
• With respect to ground-up development projects, there are three additional 
governance issues of critical importance.  These include contractor control, 
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construction process control and development-related cash management and 
capital calls. 
• The level of control required by investors does not necessarily change across 
properties of different risk, instead, the quantity of issues that must be controlled 
for increases. 
• There appears to be a strong positive correlation between the level of control 
demanded by an investor and that investor’s level of investment in a project (as a 
percentage of total equity). 
• There are two primary types of return structures in wide use today with respect to 
real estate equity investments.  They include preferred equity investments and 
participating equity investments.  These basic return structure models are often 
tailored to meet the needs of the parties to a given project. 
• Investors with preferred equity positions in real estate projects will generally 
require less direct decision-making control as a result of their more secure equity 
position. 
• The primary negotiated variables with respect to real estate equity returns are the 
hurdle return rates, profit percentages (promotes), and carried interest amounts.  
The actual values of these variables differ significantly by transaction and are 
largely a result of the equity partners’ negotiating leverage upon entering into the 
venture. 
 
Having spent many weeks sifting through volumes of legal documents and speaking with 
a variety industry experts, the author acknowledges that he has merely scratched the 
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surface of this intriguing topic.  Much more rigorous study could be pursued in 
attempting to measure risk allocation as a function of decision-making control and how it 
is tied to an investor’s equity investment.  An interesting comparison in this vein, for 
example, would be to evaluate governance provisions and control rights within 
syndicated real estate projects versus those within traditional joint ventures.  It would be 
interesting to explore the relationship between the control rights of an investor in a 
syndicated project as a function of that investor’s equity investment versus a joint 
venturer’s control rights as a function of its equity investment.  In doing so, one might be 
able to make some generalizations about which investment type is inherently more or less 
risky (as a function of each investors ability to control the outcome of their investment), 
and perhaps, based on the returns associated with the different investment models, which 
investment provides a better risk-adjusted return for underlying projects that may contain 
the same risk profile. 
 
Similarly, more rigorous study with respect to real estate equity return structures would 
certainly yield fruitful results.  While there appear to be two dominant models, as 
discussed in this paper, one might be able to more systematically categorize the different 
variations on these models and perhaps identify factors that result in certain variations.  
Such information would be valuable for investors and sponsors alike as they negotiate 
ever more complex joint venture relationships. 
 
In any case, the world of real estate equity is an important one - one that warrants 
continued careful attention.  History has proven that there will likely always be an 
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“equity gap.”  And as long as there is, real estate practitioners will be looking for better 
ways to fill it. 
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Additional Sources 
 
Fifteen interviews were conducted with a variety of real estate industry professionals 
whose identities must remain confidential. 
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Eight joint venture real estate operating agreements currently in use by a range of 
reputable institutional and private real estate investment entities were analyzed for the 
purposes of this study.  The sources and identifying features of such operating 
agreements must remain confidential. 
 
